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Virtually every discussion of secularization asserts that high levels
of religiosity in the United States make it a decisive counterexample
to the claim that modern societies are prone to secularization. Focus-
ing on trends rather than levels, the authors maintain that, for two
straightforward empirical reasons, the United States should no longer
be considered a counterexample. First, it has recently become clear
that American religiosity has been declining for decades. Second, this
decline has been produced by the generational patterns underlying re-
ligious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less
religious than the preceding one. America is not an exception. These
ﬁndings change the theoretical import of the United States for debates
about secularization.
INTRODUCTION
The religiosity of the United States has impressed observers at least since
the time of Alexis de Tocqueville, and to this day American levels of reli-
gious involvement remain strikingly high compared to those in virtually all
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highly developed countries. Many features of this well-known phenome-
non could be explored, but we focus on the enormous weight it carries in
debates about the secularization thesis—the idea that modernization tends
to undermine religious belief and activity. However one deﬁnes “modern-
ization,” critics of the secularization thesis commonly treat the United
States—an indisputably modern yet highly religious country—as a deci-
sive counterexample to that thesis. The state of American religion is not the
only evidence that critics marshal against the secularization thesis, but the
religious situation in the United States often, perhaps always, plays a key
role in the criticism.
Berger, Davie, and Fokas, for example, do not mince words when they
write that the “comparison ½between European and American religion is
crucial, not only because it helps to shoot out of the water the aforemen-
tioned secularization theory” ð2008, p. 21Þ. Later in the same book, they
similarly write: “There have been many reasons for the demise of sec-
ularization theory . . . but the America-Europe comparison is a big nail in
the cofﬁn of the theory” ðp. 141Þ. Whether or not they are critics of the
secularization thesis, reviewers of the secularization literature uniformly
recognize the crucial importance of the American case. De Graaf, for
example, notes how “the relatively high levels of religious participation in the
United States cast doubt on the secularization thesis” ð2013, p. 321Þ. The
author of the “American Exceptionalism?” chapter in the most recent
Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion puts it this way: “The
decline of secularization theory . . . has resulted in considerable part from
coming to terms with the fact that the United States has been more given to
religious observance than its Western European cousins” ðTorpey 2010,
p. 155Þ. And in their Annual Review of Sociology article on the subject,
Gorski and Altinordu ð2008, p. 57Þ observed that “deﬁning secularization
½as a decline in individual belief and practice allows ½secularization critics
to argue that the United States is a fatal anomaly for secularization because
the United States is indisputably modern ðurbanized, democratized, indus-
trialized, rationalized, etc.Þ but not secular in their terms.”
Perhaps the clearest representation of this “United States as secularization
counterexample” claim is a graph included in the ﬁrst chapter of Wald and
Calhoun-Brown’s widely used textbook, Religion and Politics in the United
States ð2011, p. 9Þ. The graph shows the strong linear negative relationship
across 47 countries between economic development ðmeasured as gross na-
tional income per capitaÞ and the proportion of people saying that religion
is “very important” in their lives. But the United States is an outlier, lying
well off the regression line. The graph’s theoretical import is clear: “Amer-
ican religion, like Mark Twain, has obstinately refused to comply with re-
ports of its demise. . . . The naïve model of secularization cannot withstand
the facts” ðp. 8Þ.
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Critics of the secularization thesis sometimes also assert that American
levels of religiosity are not just high but have been stable for decades. Gree-
ley’s elegant and inﬂuential 1989 summary of American religious trends, for
example, concluded by observing that, although a few minor survey items
show change over time, “most of the other social indicators discussed in the
previous chapters best ﬁt—sometimes with minor adjustments—the stability
model.” He draws the usual conclusion: “If ½these indicators of religiosity
have not changed, is there not reason to assert that there is a certain long-
term stability in American religious behavior whatever important changes
might also be occurring? Is there not even more reason to assert that the
secularization model . . . is unsupported by the available social indicators?”
ðGreeley 1989, pp. 115–16Þ.2
Critics of the secularization thesis sometimes accept some evidence of
decline in American religion but then discount the theoretical signiﬁcance
of that decline. Berger et al., for example, acknowledge some decline but
dismiss its importance: “In the United States, ½unbelief is also growing, but
from an inﬁnitesimally small base” ð2008, p. 57Þ. Martin discounts religious
decline in the United States in a different way: “The USA as a whole has
been known for the remarkably stable character of its religion since indices
peaked in the mid-twentieth century, and that has remained true until re-
cently” ð2011, p. 88Þ. And Putnam and Campbell discount the signiﬁcance
of religious decline in yet another way: “If we are witnessing such a ½sec-
ularization process in the United States, at this rate it will take a couple of
centuries to reduce American religious observance to the current European
levels. . . . Thus, while recognizing the slow generational decline in Amer-
ican religiosity over the last half century, we are skeptical about bold as-
sertions of secularization in America” ð2010, p. 76Þ. In short, when looking
at the United States, secularization critics either deny religious decline or,
when acknowledging some decline, discount its signiﬁcance by emphasizing
the still high levels of American religiosity, the recent start of decline, or the
slowness of decline. The result is to preserve the United States’ standing as
a decisive counterexample to the secularization thesis.
Defenders of the secularization thesis similarly recognize the theoretical
import of the United States. For them, embarrassingly strong American re-
ligion presents a case with which they must grapple, a puzzle they must
somehow solve to sustain the secularization thesis. The most common solu-
tion has been to claim that American religiosity is somehow not as religious
as it appears to be. Perhaps the most famous version of this response is
Luckmann’s 1967 invocation of internal secularization: “The distribution
of church religion in America, nevertheless, does not represent a reversal
2See Berger et al. ð2008, p. 21Þ and Wald and Calhoun-Brown ð2011, pp. 13–14Þ for
similar claims.
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of the trend toward ‘secularization’—that is, a resurgence of traditional
church religion. It is rather the result of a radical inner change in American
church religion. . . . We are led to the conclusion that traditional church
religion was pushed to the periphery of ‘modern’ life in Europe while it
became more ‘modern’ in America by undergoing a process of internal sec-
ularization” ðLuckman 1967, pp. 36–37Þ. This same kind of response was
offered more recently by Steve Bruce, one of the most eloquent and staunch
defenders of the secularization thesis. Approvingly citing Bryan Wilson’s
1966 claim that “while Europeans secularized by abandoning the churches,
Americans secularized their churches,”Bruce says: “Wilson’s belief that the
enduring popularity of churchgoing in the USA may well reﬂect important
changes in the substance of American religion now seems prescient. . . . In
addition to the evidence of church decline, we need to appreciate the extent
to which the content of American Christianity has been secularized” ð2011,
pp. 160, 165Þ. The now well-established fact that Americans overreport
their religious service attendance, and by margins considerably greater
than people in other modern countries, is also often used by defenders of
the secularization thesis as evidence that American religiosity is not as
strong as it appears at ﬁrst glance.3
In this article, we develop the claim that the United States is not a coun-
terexample to the secularization thesis, but not because of internal secular-
ization. Rather, we argue that the United States should not be considered a
counterexample for two straightforward empirical reasons. First, Ameri-
can religiosity has in fact been declining for decades, and second, that de-
cline has been produced by the same generational patterns that lie behind
religious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less re-
ligious than the preceding one. Taken together, these two facts mean that
recent trends in religiosity are remarkably similar throughout the Western
world, including the United States. The common story is decline driven by
cohort replacement. The United States is not an exception. And since our
claim is that American religiosity should no longer be considered a coun-
terexample even when its religiosity levels are taken at face value, we side-
step debates about whether American religiosity is truly religious. If the
United States is not a secularization counterexample even if American re-
ligiosity indicates real religious commitment, then a fortiori it is not a coun-
terexample if American religiosity is substantially overreported, if it indi-
cates sociability more than religious belief, or if American religion is in some
sense internally secularized.
3Substantial American overreporting was ﬁrst established by Hadaway, Marler, and Chaves
ð1993Þ; subsequent studies have conﬁrmed it. See Brenner ð2011Þ for international com-
parisons. Some writers have recently asserted that Europeans underreport their religious
service attendance, but we know of no evidence documenting underreporting in any Eu-
ropean country.
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We are not the ﬁrst to notice the signs of American religious decline.4
However, when it is noticed at all, this decline has been minimized and dis-
counted by secularization critics, and even advocates of the secularization
thesis have pulled their punches on this point.5 We establish the decline of
American religiosity more ﬁrmly than earlier scholars were able to do. Pre-
vious analysts have missed this decline, or have understated it, because the
decline is slow, and only recently have we accumulated enough data over
a long enough period to see it clearly. Some scholars have begun to notice
these signs of erosion in religiosity, but few have grasped how strong the
evidence for decades-long decline truly is, and hence the signiﬁcance of that
decline is discounted even by those who notice it.
Similarly, we are not the ﬁrst to examine cohort differences in American
religiosity. On the contrary, the analysis of such differences has a long his-
tory, characterized by mixed results. The presence or absence of genera-
tional decline in American church attendance has been particularly conten-
tious. Sasaki and Suzuki ð1987Þ examined attendance from 1952 to 1982 and
found decline among post-1927 birth cohorts. In a paper published just
three months later, Hout and Greeley ð1987Þ argued that church atten-
dance was stable from 1940 to 1984, with the exception of a drop among
all Catholics between 1968 and 1975. Chaves ð1989, 1991Þ found evidence
of both secularization ðcohort-based declineÞ and revival ðperiod-based in-
creases among ProtestantsÞ. Hout and Greeley ð1990Þ and Firebaugh and
Harley ð1991Þ contested those conclusions, arguing against the hypothesis
of generational declines in religiosity and in favor of life-course increases.
Ploch and Hastings ð1994Þ came down on the side of age rather than cohort
effects, while Miller and Nakamura ð1996Þ supported the idea of genera-
tional change, although they saw it as a one-time shift associated with the
1960s rather than a gradual and continuing decline. Presser and Chaves
ð2007Þ also suggested that change may be discontinuous, on the basis of an
absence of any overall trend in church attendance between 1990 and 2006.
Schwadel ð2010aÞ asserted that frequency of attendance was shaped by
strong positive age effects, modest period decline in the 1990s, and no sub-
stantial cohort differences. Using a different method the following year, he
concluded that “regular religious service attendance declines moderately
4The basic patterns have been described in Putnam and Campbell ð2010Þ and in Chaves
ð2011Þ. See Grant ð2008Þ for a creative aggregate measure of religiosity that also shows
decline in recent decades.
5Norris and Inglehart, e.g., say that the evidence about U.S. religiosity “remains some-
what ambiguous” because “religious participation may have eroded” and “secular ten-
dencies may have strengthened” ðNorris and Inglehart 2004, pp. 89, 94, 95; emphasis
addedÞ. Similarly, in building his case for why the United States is not a secularization
counterexample, Bruce ð2011Þ relies more on American overreporting of church atten-
dance and the ways in which American religion has internally secularized than on evi-
dence of religious decline.
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from the early 1970s to 2006, and this change is predominantly due to dif-
ferences across cohorts” ðSchwadel 2011, p. 190Þ. Age-period-cohort stud-
ies of afﬁliation, belief, and other indicators of religious commitment have
produced similarly mixed results.
The inconsistent ﬁndings characterizing this literature have arisen partly
because of the analytical difﬁculties in studying cohort differences and partly
because it is difﬁcult in any case to identify the components of change with
data from only a couple of decades. As with the aggregate decline in religi-
osity, the picture has become clearer as time has passed and more data have
become available. Using data that now span four decades, analyzing these
data sets with straightforward methods, studying several aspects of religi-
osity, and placing the American cohort patterns in comparative perspective,
we establish just how strong the U.S. cohort differences in religious afﬁli-
ation, belief, and behavior really are and how similar they are to generation
gaps observed throughout the modern world. Our results support previous
research that has found strong cohort differences in American religiosity,
but our primary aim is to emphasize the signiﬁcance of this fact for the claim
that the United States is a counterexample to the secularization thesis.
A terminological note: we will not review the secularization literature as
a whole, nor will we provide yet another overview of the many thorny con-
ceptual and empirical issues raised in debates about secularization. Excel-
lent reviews are available elsewhere.6 Relatedly, we will not discuss the best
ways to conceptualize “modernization” or “secularization.” We do not en-
gage in those debates because the United States is treated as a counterex-
ample to the secularization thesis however “modernization” and “seculari-
zation” are deﬁned. For our purposes, it is enough to say that modernization
refers to the mix of industrialization, democratization, urbanization, ratio-
nalization, cultural diversity, expanded education, and increased prosper-
ity that characterizes contemporary Western societies, including the United
States, and that secularization refers to the decline of traditional religious
belief and practice among individuals ðLipset 1959; Bruce 2011Þ. We focus,
in other words, on individual-level secularization rather than institutional
differentiation or other types or meanings of secularization. We agree with
Gorski and Altinordu ð2008, p. 75Þ that, since we are focused on individual-
level secularization only in historically Christian countries, we could sub-
stitute “unchurching” or “de-Christianization” for “secularization” without
any loss in meaning. Our point holds whether secularization is conceptu-
alized as the undermining of religious belief and practice in modern socie-
ties or more narrowly as the undermining of traditional Christian beliefs
and practices in historically Christian modern societies.
6Recent overviews of the secularization literature include Gorski and Altinordu ð2008Þ,
Bruce ð2011Þ, and De Graaf ð2013Þ.
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RELIGIOUS DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
Americans remain remarkably religious in both belief and practice, par-
ticularly as compared to people elsewhere in theWest. The continuing high
levels of American religiosity, coupled with the slow pace of decline, have
made it easy to miss the signs of decline or to discount them when they are
noticed. Here we brieﬂy summarize the evidence that religious afﬁliation, at-
tendance, and belief have been declining—if slowly—for several decades. A
more detailed description of these and other trends can be found in Chaves
ð2011Þ.
As is well known from coverage in the general media, the proportion of
Americans who say that they have no religious afﬁliation has increased.
This is a long-term trend, but the pace of change quickened substantially in
the 1990s. In 1957, 3% of Americans said they had no religious afﬁliation
ðU.S. Bureau of the Census 1958Þ. By 2012, the ﬁgure had increased to 20%,
according to both the General Social Survey ðGSSÞ and the Pew Research
Center ð2012Þ. This increase reﬂects a growing willingness among the least
religious people to say that they have no religion as well as a decline in mean-
ingful attachments to religious traditions, but the cultural change is signif-
icant in either case. A society in which the least religious people still claim a
religious identity is importantly different from a society in which such people
admit to themselves, and even tell others, that they in fact have no religion.
Attendance at services began declining at least 15 or 20 years before the
ﬁrst GSS in 1972, at least among Catholics ðFischer and Hout 2006, pp. 203–
5Þ. Time-use studies also register a decline in the decades before 1990, from
approximately 40% in 1965 to about 27% in 1993 ðPresser and Stinson 1998Þ.
This ﬁnding is reinforced by studies that track attendance trends among
children and those that compare attendance rates among young people at
different points in time ðHofferth and Sandberg 2001;Wuthnow 2007, p. 53Þ.
Average weekly attendance continued to fall slowly since 1990, and more
extensive forms of involvement also have declined. The GSS occasionally
asks people how often they participate in a religious congregation’s activ-
ities beyond attending services. Seventeen percent of Americans said that
they did so nearly every week or more in the 1990s, declining to 11% in the
ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. The trend is the same for people who at-
tend regularly.
At the same time, the number of people who never attend religious ser-
vices has doubled in two and a half decades, going from 13% in 1990 to
26% in 2014. Much like the rising percentage of religious “nones,” the rising
percentage of people who never attend services mainly represents a change
from a culture in which quite irreligious people still hold on to religious
identities, even if religion has ceased to be personally signiﬁcant, to one in
which these people let go of those identities.
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Smith ð2009Þ combined various surveys to show that while in the 1950s
99% of Americans said they believed in God, that number dropped, slowly
but steadily, to stand at 92% in 2008. It is 91.2% in the 2014 GSS, a ﬁgure
that includes the responses “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do
believe in a Higher Power of some kind” and “I ﬁnd myself believing in
God some of the time, but not at others.” This decline is stretched out over
ﬁve decades, but change has occurred. There is also a long-term, slow but
discernible, decline in belief in an inerrant Bible. Over the last 30 years, the
percentage of people who say they believe that the Bible should be taken
literally declined from approximately 40% to just over 30%.
These declines in traditional religiosity are not offset by increasing vi-
tality elsewhere. It is true that the “spiritual but not religious” phenomenon
has expanded in recent years. In 1998, 9% of GSS respondents described
themselves as at least moderately spiritual but not more than slightly reli-
gious. That number rose to 17% in 2014. This increase occurred because
nonreligious people are more likely to say that they are spiritual. This dif-
fuse spirituality may provide a growing market for certain kinds of reli-
gious products, such as self-help books with spiritual themes, but it is not
offsetting religious decline, reenergizing existing religious institutions, or pro-
viding a foundation for new kinds of religious institutions or new forms of
religious collective action.
Relatedly, there is an increase in the number of people who say that they
believe in life after death, but that increase has occurred especially among
Jews and people who say that they have no religion ðChaves 2011, p. 38Þ.
This is best understood as an increase in a generic and diffuse spirituality
rather than in traditional religious belief because the largest increases in
belief in life after death are among the least religious Americans and among
subgroups that have not traditionally emphasized an afterlife. There may
be more diffuse spirituality now than previously, but it should not be mis-
taken for an increase in traditional religiosity. On the contrary, it is prob-
ably a consequence of the waning of traditional religiosity, every indicator
of which is either stable or declining.
The evidence for a decades-long decline in American religiosity is now
incontrovertible. Like the evidence for global warming, it comes from mul-
tiple sources, shows up in several dimensions, and paints a consistent fac-
tual picture. The American decline may be slower than in much of the West,
and it might have started later than in some other places, but it is moving
the society in a similar direction.
This decades-long but only recently visible decline in American religion
should by itself give pause to those who want to claim that the United
States is a counterexample to the secularization thesis. It might still be
thought, however, that American religion is declining in a distinctive way.
If, for example, American religion is merely suffering from a slump pro-
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duced by transient and peculiarly American historical circumstances, then
perhaps it will turn the corner. If, however, the proximate causes of decline
are similar to those observed elsewhere—including countries where religious
belief and practice have been in decline for more than a century—then it is
much harder to maintain that the United States is truly an exception to the
secularization thesis.
In what follows we show that in a fundamental respect the American
pattern of decline is remarkably similar to the pattern found throughout
theWest: the decline is driven by generational differences in religiosity. We
focus on comparisons with other English-speaking countries: Great Brit-
ain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. We start with Great Britain be-
cause of obvious historical, linguistic, and cultural connections to the United
States but also because Britain ðwhere there are large Catholic and Prot-
estant “free church” minorities, as well as smaller but now substantial non-
Christian groupsÞ has been religiously diverse for centuries, and the priv-
ileges enjoyed by Anglicans were largely eroded by the late Victorian
period.7 We include the other three countries because, in addition to
sharing the English language ðand in the case of Canada, the same con-
tinentÞ, like the United States they were settled mainly by European im-
migrants. The truth, however, is that the pattern of religious decline in
these countries has been very similar to that observed throughout Europe
ðVoas 2009Þ, so our conclusions about similarities with the United States
do not at all depend on choosing to focus on these particular cases.
DATA
We use the British Social Attitudes ðBSAÞ surveys from 1983 to 2013, com-
missioned tables from the population censuses in Australia ð1971–2011Þ and
New Zealand ð1986–2013Þ, and the Canadian GSS, 1985–2012. In the
United States, the GSS from 1972 to 2014 provides comparable data. In
Australia and New Zealand, using census data means that we can examine
only trends in religious afﬁliation in those two countries. We examine other
available religious variables in the other countries, treating each measure in
ways that are appropriate for each country, given data limitations. Since
religiosity is multidimensional, and since multiple indicators of religiosity
show the same basic pattern, using a range of available indicators is more
appropriate than focusing only on items that are operationalized more or
less identically in each country. Our strategy reinforces the point that our
conclusions are not limited to any particular aspect of religiosity or way of
operationalizing it.
7We refer to Great Britain rather than to the United Kingdom because our data do not
include Northern Ireland.
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In Great Britain, the BSA survey is the main source for research on
religious change. ðThe census now includes a question on religion, but that
question appeared for the ﬁrst time in 2001.Þ The survey has run annually
since 1983, with gaps only in 1988 and 1992; it is conducted by NatCen
Social Research using a random sample of more than 3,000 adults every
year.8 There are lengthy face-to-face interviews with respondents, in ad-
dition to which self-completion questionnaires are left to be returned by mail.
The data are made available by the U.K. Data Archive 12–18 months
after ﬁeldwork has concluded. Various topics are covered in depth each
year, often as the result of funding from government departments or
academic research projects. The relatively stable core includes questions on
religious afﬁliation ð“Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular
religion?”Þ and attendance ð“Apart from such special occasions as weddings,
funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend services or meet-
ings connected with your religion?”Þ.
In Australia, a population census is conducted every ﬁve years by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics. Although a question on religious afﬁliation
has been included since the early 20th century, the possibility of specifying
“no religion” has been explicit only since 1971, before which less than 1%
of the population was so recorded. The question on religion is optional, but
it is answered by about 90% of the population. ð“Not stated” cases are
omitted in the analysis.Þ Respondents were originally asked to write in a
religion or “none,” but in 1991 the form was changed to provide a list of the
main denominations, which as discussed below produced a modest rise in
the level of afﬁliation. Relevant tables were commissioned from the Aus-
tralian Bureau of Statistics.
New Zealand also carries out a population census every ﬁve years. The
data collection that was scheduled for early March 2011 was postponed
when a major earthquake struck Christchurch, the country’s second-largest
city, two weeks before the census date. A replacement census was conducted
in March 2013. The answer format changed in 1986, producing a substan-
tial rise in the proportion choosing to identify with no religion; only censuses
since that date are used here. For censuses from 2001, individuals have been
allowed to select up to four responses to the religion question, although only
4% in 2001 and 2% in 2006 and 2013 chose more than one. In the analysis
that follows, multiple responses and nonresponses are excluded. Special
tables were commissioned from Statistics New Zealand to include country
of birth, to separate single and multiple responses, and to provide nonstan-
dard age groups for 2013 ðwhen the gap since the previous census was
seven rather than ﬁve yearsÞ.
8The sample includes adults age 18 and over; for the reasons set out in n. 9 and to be
consistent across countries, we restrict our attention to respondents age 20–84.
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The GSS in Canada began in 1985 and is conducted by Statistics Can-
ada, the national statistical agency. Data are gathered by telephone. The
sample consists of individuals age 15 and older, but our analyses include
only adults age 20 and older. No surveys were carried out in 1987 or 1997; in
addition, the 2002 and 2007 surveys sampled only persons age 45 and older.
We exclude those years. Sample sizes range between 10,000 and 25,000;
response rates have been 70%–80%. The public use microdata ﬁles some-
times supply single years of age but for most years categorize age in ﬁve-
year bands. Where necessary, the totals in each age group were distributed
pro rata in constructing the 10-year birth cohorts shown below in ﬁg-
ures 5–7.
Questions on religious afﬁliation and attendance have been included
since the inception of the survey, and a new question on the importance of
religious or spiritual belief was introduced in 2003. Until recently only re-
spondents who stated a religious afﬁliation were asked about attendance,
so our data on religious practice are restricted to people who say that they
have a religion. In addition, respondents who answered the question “How
important are your religious or spiritual beliefs to the way that you live your
life?” with “not at all important” were not asked about attendance in 2003
and 2004. We have imputed a value of “less than monthly” for this group.
The GSS in the United States is run by the National Opinion Research
Center at the University of Chicago and involves face-to-face interviews
with a random sample of noninstitutionalized adults age 18 and over ðSmith,
Marsden, and Hout 2015Þ. It was conducted annually from 1972 until 1994
ðexcept in 1979, 1981, and 1992Þ and every other year since then. Sample
sizes for each survey range from approximately 1,500 to approximately 3,000.
Questions on religious afﬁliation and attendance have always been part of
the survey, although the question on strength of religious afﬁliation was
only introduced in 1974. A question on belief in God ðwith six answer cat-
egoriesÞ ﬁrst appeared in 1988. We exclude the black oversamples from
1982 and 1987. We restrict our analysis to individuals age 20–84.9
METHODS
Our primary empirical claim is that generational differences are driving
religious decline throughout the West. Establishing this claim requires us
to grapple with the thorny issue of how to distinguish generational change
from changes related to aging and from changes produced by historical
9The GSS sample includes individuals age 18 and over. We omit 18- and 19-year-olds
because survey nonresponse tends to be high among young adults, making teenage re-
spondents unrepresentative, and also because religious identity and practice have often
not stabilized until the early 20s. We are concerned in addition that at advanced ages the
sample may become unrepresentative, and so we omit respondents age 85 and over.
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developments that affect all generations. This is the notorious age-period-
cohort ðAPCÞ problem that has vexed sociologists at least since Ryder’s land-
mark article ð1965Þ. Recent attempts to disentangle age, period, and cohort
effects have tackled topics as diverse as fertility ðBongaarts and Sobotka
2012Þ, sexual mores ðKraaykamp 2002Þ, trust ðRobinson and Jackson 2001Þ,
civic participation ðVan Ingen 2008Þ, alcohol consumption ðKarlamangla
et al. 2006Þ, and happiness ðYang 2008Þ. Religion has not escaped attention
ðVoas and Crockett 2005; Wolf 2008; Schwadel 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013Þ.
The fundamental methodological challenge is posed by what is known
as the APC identiﬁcation problem, which arises because any two of the fac-
tors determine the third ðe.g., age 5 year of observation 2 year of birthÞ.
There has been persistent confusion among social scientists over the nature of
this problem, caused in part by preoccupation with the methodological dif-
ﬁculties that arise in trying to use all three factors as independent variables in
multivariate analysis. This preoccupation leads people to overlook the more
fundamental substantive problem, which is the difﬁculty in deciding which
effect, or combination of effects, explains what is observed. Solving the
identiﬁcation problem does not equate to solving the substantive problem:
model identiﬁcation is not equivalent to identifying the actual effects.
Glenn made this point very forcefully: “The continued search for a sta-
tistical technique that can be mechanically applied always to correctly
estimate the effects is one of the most bizarre instances in the history of
science of repeated attempts to do something that is logically impossible”
ð2005, p. 6Þ.
We proceed in three steps, beginning with graphical examination of the
data. Generally the most helpful representations are graphs in which the
vertical axis is the level of religious involvement ðe.g., the percentage of
respondents who say they attend religious services at least monthlyÞ and
the horizontal axis is survey year, with separate lines plotting each birth
cohort’s religiosity as it ages.10 Our graphs’ vertical axes do not all show
the same range of possible values because we want to scrutinize between-
and within-cohort changes in each country, a goal that is best achieved by
a ﬂexible treatment of these axes. Thus, differences across countries and
indicators are not visually emphasized in our graphs, but these differences
in levels of religiosity are easily discerned by reading the values on the ver-
tical axis.
Our second step is to employ Firebaugh’s technique for decomposing
aggregate change into between- and within-cohort components ðFirebaugh
and Davis 1988; Firebaugh 1989, 1997Þ. Finally, we combine the graphical
10We plot a point on the graph for the birth cohort only if the number of respondents in
that cohort in a particular year passes a threshold value, which for the United States is
set at 100.
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evidence and decomposition results with established substantive knowl-
edge and common sense to draw conclusions about what combination of
age, period, and cohort effects most likely produced the patterns we ob-
serve. Because there are always different APC combinations that are con-
sistent with the data ðthe essence of the identiﬁcation problemÞ, it is im-
portant to consider alternative possibilities, which we do. As readers will see,
taken together, the graphical evidence, decomposition results, and estab-
lished substantive knowledge lead us to strongly favor a cohort-replacement
explanation over alternative interpretations that could, as logical possibil-
ities, have produced the observed patterns.
We have deliberately chosen not to rely on more elaborate statistical
techniques, all of which have been subject to methodological criticism. In
the past decade, the cross-classiﬁed multilevel model ðYang and Land
2006, 2013aÞ and the intrinsic estimator ðYang, Fu, and Land 2004; Yang
et al. 2008; Yang and Land 2013aÞ have come to be seen as the state-of-the-
art tools of choice for APC analysis, but criticisms have recently been lev-
eled against these methods ðLuo 2013; Luo and Hodges, forthcoming; Bell
and Jones 2014; Pelzer et al. 2015Þ. Fortunately for our analysis, we do not
need to take sides in this debate because even the main proponents of these
techniques acknowledge that they are not a universal solution to the iden-
tiﬁcation problem and there are situations in which they are not appro-
priately used ðYang and Land 2013b, p. 1971Þ. Religious change is one such
situation: whether we rely on statistical parsimony or substantive knowl-
edge and common sense, our data can be adequately described using a
single- or two-factor model.
We therefore sidestep the statistical debates by using methods that are
intuitive and transparent. In the case at hand we believe that a relatively
simple approach making use of substantive knowledge and judgment is
preferable to mechanical model speciﬁcation and estimation. Readers can
examine the visualizations and the supporting decompositions and decide
for themselves whether alternative interpretations of the evidence are
plausible.
Firebaugh’s decomposition technique is appropriate here, however,
because rather than trying to isolate all three possible effects—cohort, age,
and period—it distinguishes aggregate change produced by cohort replace-
ment from aggregate change produced by change at the individual level.
Individual change could of course be related to aging or to period, and we
offer observations about various interpretive possibilities. But our core
concern is to establish the importance of cohort differences in religiosity,
and this technique is well suited to that task. Details on how we apply it
can be found in the appendix.
We should mention one other methodological issue. Using censuses or
repeated cross-sectional surveys to investigate religious change within and
United States and the Secularization Thesis
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across generations involves tracking birth cohorts over time. Since our fo-
cus is on endogenous social change, the composition of these groups needs
to be fairly stable. If the population is being refreshed by immigration,
these compositional changes will obscure any shifts in the previously res-
ident population. We therefore focus on the native-born populations of
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.11 Country of birth
was not included in the BSA surveys until recently, and so as a proxy for
native British status we consider just respondents of white ethnicity.
The impact of immigration on a society’s religiosity is an important issue
in its own right, but generational change can be pushing religiosity down
in a society even if immigration pushes in the opposite direction. Our ob-
jective is to establish the extent to which cohort replacement contributes to
religious change, and focusing on the native born is the best way to do
that. At the same time, since U.S. immigration history is often invoked as
a reason for ongoing high levels of religiosity in the United States, we con-
ﬁrmed that our key results and conclusions do not change if we take im-
migrants into account. We say more about this issue at the end of the results
section.
RESULTS
The Generational Dynamics of Religious Decline in Four Countries
Great Britain
As ﬁgure 1 shows, religious afﬁliation in Great Britain has declined from
one cohort to the next for years of birth going back to the beginning of the
20th century. The largest drops occurred among people born after the
Second World War, particularly in the early postwar decades. There is re-
markable stability over the adult life course for all generations. The changes
that have been observed in total religious adherence arise entirely from dif-
ferences between rather than within cohorts. The ﬁrst line of decomposition
results in table 1 further supports this conclusion. The key number is in
column 11, which shows the cohort replacement effect from the linear de-
composition model. The model implies that cohort replacement would have
decreased religious afﬁliation in Great Britain by 21.3 percentage points,
close to the observed decline of 20.2 percentage points ðcol. 5Þ.
Age and period effects are not obvious in either ﬁgure 1 or table 1, if they
exist at all ðVoas and Crockett 2005; Crockett and Voas 2006Þ. While they
might be present but completely offsetting, we do not ﬁnd this alternative
11Respondents were only asked whether they were born in the United States from 1977
onward. For earlier years, and where there are missing values on the nativity question,
we treat being resident in the country at age 16 as a proxy. We estimate that fewer than
2% of resident-at-16 respondents for the years 1973–76 would have been born abroad.
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hypothesis plausible. In the ﬁrst place, it seems more credible that age and
period effects are weak or nonexistent than that they are strong but per-
fectly balanced. The longer the period, the more surprising it would be to
maintain this balance, and the BSA series has been running for three de-
cades. Similarly, it seems highly unlikely that age and period effects would
be completely offsetting everywhere, yet a similar pattern is observed in all
of the countries we study here as well as others that we do not examine in
this article. If there is a tendency for adults to become more religious as they
grow older, age effects should be apparent somewhere.
Second, the mechanism that produces cohort effects is straightforward:
we are socialized by the religious environment of our upbringing, and mem-
bers of each successive cohort in Great Britain ðand elsewhere in the WestÞ
are less likely to have been raised in religious households and are therefore
less likely to be religious as adults. By contrast, perfectly counterbalancing
age and period effects would imply that each person faces an ongoing strug-
gle between proreligion forces associated with aging and antireligion external
forces that continuously ﬁght to a more or less perfectly balanced standoff.
Struggle of this sort is not apparent.
Third, if the age and period trends were in balance, the cohort lines
would be equidistant from each other. The fact that they are not would re-
quire there to be cohort effects operating alongside the period decline. In
FIG. 1.—Religious afﬁliation by decade of birth, Great Britain, 1983–2013. Data are
from the British Social Attitudes survey, 1983–2013. Includes white respondents age 20–
84. Three-survey moving average.
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order to adjust the cohort starting points appropriately, these effects would
sometimes be positive and sometimes negative. The combination of a con-
stantly negative and strong period effect with cohort differences that some-
times are positive and sometimes negative seems extremely unlikely. It is
much more likely that irreligious times produce irreligious generations and
vice versa. By contrast, if cohort differences are mainly responsible for re-
ligious change, the varying size of the generation gap can be explained much
more plausibly by modest variations in the rate of intercohort decline in
religious socialization.
Finally, we would expect that any age effects on religious afﬁliation come
about because of life-course events like setting up a home independently,
marrying, having children, or retirement. Age effects are therefore unlikely
to be perfectly linear over an adult lifespan. Figure 1 shows no sign of sub-
stantial event-based shifts in religious afﬁliation, however. If perturbations
produced by life-course events are ironed out by compensating period and
cohort effects, the combinations required become improbably complex.
All in all, therefore, the most straightforward explanation of the pattern
evident in ﬁgure 1 and the ﬁrst line of table 1 is that declining aggregate
religious afﬁliation in Great Britain is driven by cohort replacement. Log-
ically possible alternative explanations can be devised, but no alternative
explanation seems plausible in light of common sense and established knowl-
edge about correlates of religious afﬁliation. This same reasoning applies in
essence to the patterns for all of the religious variables in all of the countries
we examine.
Although it has been conventional in the United States to study weekly
attendance, we focus on attendance monthly or more often in this study.
We do so because we are interested in the size of the more or less regularly
worshipping community rather than in the number of people who claim
never to miss a week. This strategy also allows us to sidestep the possibility
that declines in weekly attendance exaggerate the decline in the church-
going population because a shift from attending weekly to once or twice a
month does not represent an exit from religious involvement.
As ﬁgure 2 shows, the patterns for attendance are similar to those for
afﬁliation. Once again the substantial contrast is between the generation
born before the First World War ðamong whom 30% were churchgoersÞ
and the youngest adult cohort ðamong whom the ﬁgure is around 7%Þ. Al-
though there is a certain amount of noise in the year-to-year results, most
cohorts show little net change in attendance levels over the three decades
covered by these surveys. On average, people from a particular decade of
birth in Britain do not seem to become much more religiously active with
age, nor have they become less active over time. Religious decline is being
driven by generational replacement, as conﬁrmed again by the decompo-
sition shown in table 1. As with afﬁliation, the cohort replacement com-
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ponent of declining attendance in Great Britain ð8.2 percentage pointsÞ is
slightly larger than the observed aggregate change ð7.0 pointsÞ.
The BSA survey included a question on belief in God ðidentical to the
one described below for the United StatesÞ for a subsample in several years
between 1991 and 2008. The small sample sizes on these items preclude pro-
ducing graphs like ﬁgures 1 and 2, but the contrasts between successive
cohorts are very clear. Among white respondents born between 1905 and
1924, 58.5% across all survey years reported either that “I know God really
exists and have no doubts about it” or “While I have doubts, I feel that I
do believe in God.” Only 17.2% of adults born in the late 1980s said the
same. And whereas most of the older believers chose the “no doubts” option,
younger theists do not have the same level of conviction.
Australia
The situation in Australia is similar. The generational contrast emerges
clearly in the proportion of people identifying with no religion in the 2011
census: only 9% of those age 80 and over but 33% of those in their 20s,
notwithstanding the immigration of young non-Christians. Figure 3 shows
the full cohort pattern. The proportion of people identifying with a religion
diminishes in each successive decade of birth, and because the census counts
FIG. 2.—Attendance at least monthly by decade of birth, Great Britain, 1983–2013.
Data are from the British Social Attitudes survey, 1983–2013. Includes white re-
spondents age 20–84. Three-survey moving average.
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are very large, it is possible to look back to people born as early as 1887.
Over the four decades covered by the data there are only weak signs of
change within generations, such as might be produced either by aging or by
historical events.
The graphs undulate slightly, with peaks in 1991 and 2001. It is possible
that something in the cultural context led to these rises and falls in religious
identiﬁcation, but these ﬂuctuations could also be measurement artifacts.
As mentioned above, in 1991 the census form provided check boxes for the
most common denominations rather than requiring write-in responses. One
striking consequence was that the number of native-born Presbyterians
age 20 and over increased by a third from the 1986 total. ðBy implication, a
quarter of self-identiﬁed Presbyterians in 1991 were so nominal that they
would have been unwilling or unable to spell out the name of their denom-
ination.Þ Catholic, Anglican, and Uniting Church numbers received more
modest boosts. It is less clear what might have caused the rise in 2001,
although the fact that the 70,500 people giving “Jedi” as their religion were
classiﬁed as “undeﬁned” rather than “none” may account for some of it.
Overall there is little here to suggest that period, let alone age, had sub-
stantial effects on religious afﬁliation in Australia before 2001. The most
signiﬁcant departure from intragenerational stability comes in the most re-
cent census in 2011, when the graphs suggest that there has been within-
FIG. 3.—Religious afﬁliation by decade of birth, Australia, 1971–2011. Data are from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics: commissioned tables from the census of population,
1971–2011. Includes only people born in Australia.
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as well as between-cohort decline. The large gap between the two youngest
cohorts ðpeople born 1967–76 and 1977–86Þ is consistent with the conjec-
ture that important secularizing forces have continued to operate. The larg-
est previous drop is associated with the cohort born in 1947–56, which
would have entered adolescence during the 1960s. The decomposition re-
sults in table 1 suggest that three-quarters of the aggregate change between
1971 and 2011 ð11.8/½11.8 1 4.2 5 .74Þ was produced by cohort replace-
ment, with individual disafﬁliation accounting for the remainder.
New Zealand
In New Zealand, 42% of the population stated on the 2013 census that they
have no religion. Here too the trend is clear: the ﬁgure stood at 20% in
1991, at 30% in 2001, and at 35% in 2006. Figure 4, which divides the
native-born population into ﬁve-year birth cohorts, shows the steadiness of
intergenerational decline. Among the elderly, Christian afﬁliation exceeds
85%, and “no religion” is in single digits. Young adults, by contrast, are
about equally split between those claiming a Christian afﬁliation and
those claiming no religion. People born in each half decade throughout the
20th century are a little less likely to have a religion than those born just ﬁve
years earlier.
FIG. 4.—Religious afﬁliation by ﬁve-year birth cohort, New Zealand, 1986–2013.
Data are from Statistics New Zealand; commissioned tables from the Census of Popu-
lation and Dwellings, 1986–2013. Includes only people born in New Zealand.
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As in Australia, the rate of change increases with cohorts born during
and after the Second World War and does not slow until the group born
between 1977 and 1981. Also as in Australia, a slight erosion in religious
identity can be seen within as well as between cohorts, and these effects are
most evident for the younger cohorts, producing some fanning out in the
graphs during the later periods. Nevertheless, the main shifts are from one
generation to the next, with relative stability within each. The statistical
decomposition in table 1 shows that cohort replacement is responsible for
the majority of the aggregate decline, reinforced by within-cohort change
in the same direction ð14.9/½14.9 1 13.4 5 .53Þ.
Canada
In Canada, reported weekly church attendance was a staggering 67% in
1946 ðVeevers and Gee 1988, p. 18Þ. It has been falling steadily ever since
and stood at 17% in 2012, although because of overreporting, the true
ﬁgure is at best half as high ðBrenner 2012Þ. In 2012, nearly half ð48%Þ of
people born in Canada said that they never attend.
Figure 5 shows that between-cohort decline in religious afﬁliation in
Canada was modest among people born before the SecondWorldWar, but
the now-familiar pattern is clear thereafter. Within-cohort decline is also
FIG. 5.—Religious afﬁliation by decade of birth, Canada, 1985–2012. Data are from
the Canadian General Social Survey, 1985–2012; includes only respondents born in
Canada. Three-survey moving average.
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apparent, and as in New Zealand the rate of decline seems to increase with
year of birth. This fanning out of the cohorts for later survey years may
indicate a period effect, but another interpretation is that religious afﬁli-
ation drops during early adulthood before becoming more stable.
Figure 6 shows monthly attendance at services for people who say that
they have a religion. ðUntil recently, only respondents who stated a reli-
gion were asked about attendance in the Canadian GSS.Þ Given the gen-
erational decline in afﬁliation, one would not necessarily expect to ﬁnd
substantial differences between cohorts in the proportion of churchgoers
among those who remain religiously afﬁliated. After all, once overtly sec-
ular respondents are excluded, religious practice might be equally frequent
among the young and the old. In fact, the differences are substantial: reli-
gious afﬁliates age 70 and above are twice as likely as adult afﬁliates less than
60 to attend at least monthly ð41% vs. 18% in 2012Þ and three times as likely
to attend weekly ð29% vs. 10%Þ. We do see a bottoming out, however.
Among people born since 1955 who identify with a religion, year of birth
makes little difference to the proportion of regular attenders. Recall,
however, that the proportion of afﬁliates has fallen substantially across
these postwar cohorts. The bottoming out of cohort differences in atten-
dance among afﬁliates should not be interpreted as a slowing down of cohort-
driven secularization in Canada.
FIG. 6.—Monthly attendance by decade of birth ðreligious afﬁliates onlyÞ, Canada.
Data are from the Canadian General Social Survey, 1985–2012. Includes only re-
spondents with a religious afﬁliation who were born in Canada. Three-survey moving
average.
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Taken together, ﬁgures 5 and 6 suggest that secularization in Canada
proceeded in stages. Members of the 1925–34 cohort started to drift away
from regular involvement in religious activity while still retaining their
religious identities. Among people born just before and after the Second
World War, we see a combination of disafﬁliation and reduced involve-
ment. For years of birth from about 1955 onward, further religious decline
has come from people taking the step of not identifying with a religion at
all. The decomposition results in table 1 show that most of the drop in af-
ﬁliation is the result of cohort replacement ð8.5/½8.5 1 6.3 5 .57Þ, but
within-cohort declines also have been substantial ð6.3/½8.5 1 6.3 5 .43Þ.
The drop in monthly attendance by afﬁliates is even more strongly cohort
based.12
Figure 7 looks beyond whether people say they have a religion, go to
church regularly, or believe in God, to examine how much difference peo-
ple say these things make in their lives. In 2003, the Canadian GSS began
asking: “How important are your religious or spiritual beliefs to the way
you live your life?” The response options were very/somewhat/not very/not
at all important. Figure 7 shows the steady fall from one decade of birth to
the next in the proportion of respondents answering “very important.” Al-
12The fall in weekly attendance among afﬁliates is entirely cohort driven ðresults avail-
able on requestÞ.
FIG. 7.—Religious or spiritual beliefs “very important” in life, by decade of birth,
Canada. Data are from the Canadian General Social Survey, 2003–12; includes only
respondents born in Canada.
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though the period covered is only nine years, the comparative unimportance
of within-cohort trends is noteworthy, as conﬁrmed by the decomposition
results in table 1, where cohort replacement accounts for four-ﬁfths of the
observed aggregate decline ð4.8/½4.81 1.35 .79Þ. Even with no smoothing,
the lines in ﬁgure 7 are virtually horizontal. By contrast, the amount of in-
tergenerational change is dramatic, with more than 60% of the oldest and
less than 20% of the youngest cohorts describing religion as very important.
Recap
The central result for Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada
is easy to state: secularization has occurred mainly, in some cases entirely,
because each successive generation is slightly less religious than the one
before. At an aggregate level, religious indicators across the adult life
course within each cohort are remarkably stable in these countries. Indi-
viduals might become more or less religious, but within birth cohorts these
gains and losses largely balance out. If there is a tilt, it is toward people
becoming somewhat less religious over time. We have highlighted the
English-speaking world, but the basic pattern is not restricted to these
countries. Analyses of religious decline in dozens of European countries also
point to the dominant role of cohort replacement ðWolf 2008; Voas 2009;
Voas and Doebler 2011Þ.
Moreover, these results do not depend on examining particular indicators
of religiosity or shifts in a particular region of the religiosity distribution. The
basic results are the same whether we examine afﬁliation, attendance, or be-
lief in God. And they are unchanged if we look at the proportion of people
who attend either more or less frequently or if we look at religious beliefs
being at least somewhat important rather than not important. Cohort re-
placement dominates the trends whatever indicator we examine and whether
we look at shifts from high to moderate or moderate to low religious com-
mitment.
As discussed above, solutions to APC problems are not unique. Alter-
native hypotheses could be advanced. In particular, a period decline in re-
ligious involvement offset by increasing religiosity with age could generate
patterns resembling those produced purely by cohort effects. For the rea-
sons discussed above, however, this interpretation seems much less plau-
sible than the one we advance. Various combinations of age and period
effects are consistent with the intracohort change that we observe, but our
central concern is to distinguish cohort replacement from intracohort change,
not to parse out different components of intracohort change.
We conclude that cohort replacement is the primary driver of religious
decline in these countries. We now turn our attention to the United States,
where we show that the same is true.
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The Generational Dynamics of Religious Decline in the United States
It was long thought that the United States was exempt from religious de-
cline, but the evidence reviewed earlier points to a different conclusion. In
what follows, we show that there also is a deeper sense in which the coun-
try is not an exception to the pattern of secularization observed throughout
the West: declining religiosity has been driven by generational change.
Afﬁliation
Among people born after 1975, declared afﬁliation in 2014 was a full 23
percentage points lower than among those born before 1935 ð71% vs.
94%Þ. Gaps between the cohorts born before 1945 are very small; the
major shift toward no religion begins with the baby boomers, and the
erosion in religious afﬁliation continues in later generations, reinforced since
1990 by what appears to be a period effect in which individuals in every
cohort, but especially the younger ones, have disafﬁliated. A considerable
amount of attention has been paid to this “rise of the nones,” revealed not
only in the GSS ðHout, Fischer, and Chaves 2013Þ but also in the Ameri-
can Religious Identiﬁcation Surveys ðKosmin and Keysar 2009Þ, in surveys
carried out by the Pew Research Center ð2012Þ, in the Baylor Religion Sur-
vey ðBaker and Smith 2009Þ, and by Gallup polls ðNewport 2012Þ.
Rather than reproduce well-known results about the “nones,” we take a
different tack in our analysis of afﬁliation trends in the United States. Since
1974, the GSS question on religious preference has been followed by one
that asks “Would you call yourself a strong X or a not very strong X?”
where X is the group chosen. Although the question is posed as a binary
choice, answers of “somewhat strong” are coded; about one in 10 respon-
dents volunteers this description of his or her afﬁliation. By distinguishing
strong or somewhat strong afﬁliation on the one hand from no afﬁliation or
a not very strong one on the other, we divide the population almost exactly
in half.
We prefer this approach because, when nominal adherence is very high,
as it is in the United States, being particularly attached to a religious iden-
tity is more sociologically meaningful than the mere fact of having an af-
ﬁliation. Respondents whose afﬁliation is “not very strong” are more sim-
ilar in their religious involvement to the unafﬁliated than they are to those
with strong religious identities. Only 8% report attending religious services
at least weekly, a ﬁgure that is far closer to the 2% of frequent attenders
among the “nones” than to the 51% of frequent attenders among the strongly
afﬁliated. Moreover, renouncing any religious identity is a high bar, and rel-
atively few people born before the end of the Second World War reached
this threshold of secularity. As we mentioned above, there was hardly any
change before the baby boom generation in the proportion of Americans
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saying they have no religion. By contrast, ﬁgure 8 shows that strong afﬁl-
iation in fact weakened for every successive generation from as far back
as we can see, to people born more than a century ago. We cannot be cer-
tain that individuals born around the time of the First World War, who
reached adulthood before and during the Second World War, were less
religious than their parents, because the GSS only began in the early 1970s.
It seems very likely, however, that the generation gaps observed at that
point already existed in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. The alternative
hypothesis—that the gap only opened up when these people were middle
aged—seems less plausible.13
The pattern of substantial and negative cohort differences is evident
across all survey years. Unlike the other countries we have examined, there
seems to have been a period, running roughly from 1978 to 1988, in which
strong afﬁliation rose by about 10 percentage points in every birth cohort.
Attendance also increased in these years, as we note below. It seems that
FIG. 8.—Strong or somewhat strong religious afﬁliation by decade of birth, United
States, 1974–2014. Data are from the General Social Survey, 1974–2014. Includes re-
spondents age 20–84 born in the United States. Three-survey moving average.
13The cohort pattern is the same if we use the more conventional afﬁliated-versus-not
distinction except that, for reasons noted in the main text, the very oldest cohorts appear
more similar to each other than they do in ﬁg. 8. Hout and Fischer ð2014, p. 428Þ
conclude that “two-thirds of the increased tendency to declare no religion is rooted in
generational succession.”
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a cultural shift in this period increased religious involvement. This 1980s
religious revival was recognized as early as 1989 ðChaves 1989Þ. Putnam
and Campbell ð2010Þ interpret it as a reaction to the social upheavals of
the 1960s and early 1970s. Whatever its cause, the revival ran its course
by the end of the Reagan presidency, and very little change within cohorts
is apparent subsequently.
Although the period covered by the GSS over the mid- to late 1970s is
very short, there are modest within-cohort declines in strong afﬁliation ðand,
for that matter, in having a religion as opposed to none, for which we have
data starting two years earlierÞ. Perhaps the 1980s religious revival mainly
involved the recovery of individuals lost during the preceding decade or
two. If so, the 1980s simply corrected for the unusually irreligious 1960s
and 1970s.
In any case, cohort replacement eroded religious afﬁliation throughout
the past four decades. This is the key point. Looking at the period as a
whole ðline 8 of table 1Þ, cohort replacement would have reduced strong
religious afﬁliation by 18.1 percentage points were it not for the offsetting
intracohort increases, especially during the 1980s. When we decompose the
change just since 1988 ðline 9 of table 1Þ, only a ﬁfth of the impact of co-
hort replacement is offset by positive within-cohort change. The very slight
upward drift within cohorts may represent a consolidation of religious iden-
tity with age. In view of the continuing and substantial decline from one gen-
eration to the next, it seems unlikely to be a period effect.
As has been seen in detail for other English-speaking countries, and as
other research shows is the case throughout the West, cohort replacement
has been pushing strong religious afﬁliation downward in the United States.
Countervailing within-cohort increases, especially during the 1980s—in-
creases not found elsewhere, except in Italy ðVezzoni and Biolcati-Rinaldi
2015Þ—have partially disguised this fundamental similarity in the under-
lying dynamics.
Attendance
We saw earlier that involvement in American religious congregations,
which mainly means attendance at worship services, has declined. The
analysis that follows shows that decline in attendance is driven by the same
cohort replacement mechanism that drives attendance declines elsewhere
in the world. For the reasons mentioned above for Great Britain, we ex-
amine the proportion of GSS respondents who say they attend at least once
per month. Note that “once a month” was the median response until 1993.
Since 1994 the median response has been “several times a year.”
The attendance pattern in ﬁgure 9 is very similar to the afﬁliation pat-
tern we saw in ﬁgure 8. Gentle decline within cohorts during the 1970s was
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followed by rising participation in the 1980s, after which within-cohort
change is very minor.
As we did for afﬁliation, we perform two different decompositions: one
for the full period and one just for the period since 1988. The results are
similar to the previous ﬁndings. The substantial cohort replacement com-
ponent in the full period suggests that aggregate attendance would have
declined by 14.7 percentage points had cohort replacement not been par-
tially offset by positive within-cohort change. Since 1988, the cohort replace-
ment component ð29.1Þ is nearly identical to the aggregate change, sug-
gesting that cohort replacement accounts for virtually all attendance
decline since 1988.14
Belief
The generational nature of changing belief in God is also apparent in the
United States, where the following question has been included on the GSS
since 1988:
FIG. 9.—Attendance monthly or more often by decade of birth, United States, 1973–
2014. Data are from the General Social Survey, 1974–2014. Includes respondents age
20–84 born in the United States. Three-survey moving average. To avoid overstating
religious decline, the unusually religious 1972 GSS sample has been excluded.
14Firebaugh and Harley ð1991Þ used linear decomposition on a much shorter period
ð1972–89Þ to investigate attendance trends. Although their analysis was based on
individual-level data and a multicategory dependent variable, our conclusions differ not
because of any disagreements over the evidence but simply because they studied a much
shorter period, alternative interpretations of the APC pattern are always available, and
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Please indicate which statement below comes closest to expressing what you
believe about God:
— I don’t believe in God;
— I don’t know whether there is a God, and I don’t believe there is a way
to ﬁnd out;
— I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher Power of
some kind;
— I ﬁnd myself believing in God some of the time, but not at others;
— While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God;
— I know God really exists and have no doubts about it.
As ﬁgure 10 shows, until recent years a majority of respondents in every
birth cohort selected the last, most conﬁdently theistic option. There is con-
siderable statistical noise in the data, but after a quarter of a century a pat-
tern is coming into view. The proportion of unequivocal believers is falling,
and the most recent cohorts seem to be opening up a gap with earlier ones.
In 2014, only 45% of young adults age 18–30 had no doubts about God’s
existence, compared with 68% of people age 65 and over. The trend lines
show steady generational drift away from unwavering belief, and there are
few signs of change with age or over time. The cohort replacement compo-
FIG. 10.—Knows God exists by decade of birth, United States, 1988–2014. Data are
from the General Social Survey, 1988–2014. Includes respondents age 20–84 born in the
United States. Three-survey moving average.
their age-effects-only interpretation seemed plausible at the time. With the beneﬁt of an
additional quarter of a century of data, however, an age-effects-only model is no longer
sustainable.
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nent in table 1 ð27.9Þ is more than sufﬁcient to account for the aggregate
change. The overall level of belief in God is being eroded as people born
early in the 20th century are replaced in the population by members of
subsequent generations with weaker religious convictions.
Upbringing
Of GSS respondents born before 1925, nearly all ð98%Þ claim to have been
raised in a religion; only 87% of those born since 1985 say the same. And
whereas in earlier decades people who grew up without a religion tended to
acquire one in later life ðoften at marriageÞ, individuals who were not
raised in a religion increasingly remain unafﬁliated.
The questions on religious socialization included in the GSS in 1991,
1998, and 2008 also reveal striking generational differences, but the small
sample sizes limit the depth of our cohort analysis for these items. To shift
the focus from afﬁliation to attendance, 72% of GSS respondents born be-
fore 1935 claim to have attended religious services “nearly every week” or
more often when age 11 or 12; for respondents born since 1965, the ﬁgure is
58%. At least part of the explanation is unsurprising: parents are less likely
to be churchgoers than in the past. Among people born before 1935, 61% said
that when they were children their mothers attended nearly every week or
more often. The ﬁgure is 56% for respondents born since 1965. Fathers are
not such frequent attenders; the corresponding values are 48% and 41% for
the older and younger generations, respectively. Americans are increasingly
less likely to grow up in households with religiously active parents and,
overall, are less likely to be religiously socialized as children. This decline in
religious socialization is surely a key part of the explanation of cohort dif-
ferences in adult religiosity. Cohort-based decline tends to be self-reinforcing,
which has important implications for the future of religious involvement.
Immigration and subpopulations
Our main aim has been to show that cohort replacement is eroding reli-
gious involvement in a number of countries, including the United States.
The relationship between immigration and religion is not directly relevant
to this claim because cohort replacement could be exerting downward pres-
sure on religiosity even if the religious population is replenished through
immigration. Even if immigration to the United States was sufﬁciently high
and immigrants were sufﬁciently religious to prevent drops in aggregate
religiosity, that would not make the United States a secularization coun-
terexample. To use a physical analogy, the secularization thesis is that the
warm bath of religiosity gradually cools in the cold climate of modern life.
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That thesis does not become untrue because the bath can be topped upwith
hot water.
In fact, however, including immigrants in the analysis makes no sub-
stantive difference to U.S. trends. Recent immigrants to the United States
are only slightly more religious than the native born. Using the entire GSS
span, the largest difference between immigrants and the native born on any
of our indicators is only 3 percentage points: 62% of the native born say that
they know God exists versus 65% for immigrants.15 And there is no differ-
ence at all between immigrants and the native born in the proportion who
say they have no religion. The differences are larger if we focus just on the
youngest cohorts or on the most recent years but not large enough to change
the main story. The aggregate trends in U.S. religiosity that we described
earlier include immigrants, implying that recent immigration has not al-
tered the slow decline in religiosity, and it does not appear likely to do so in
the near future. And none of the graphs we have presented look different if
we include immigrants in the analysis. Immigrants and immigration have
shaped and continue to shape American religion and society in important
ways, but new arrivals are too small a share of the population and are not
sufﬁciently religious to alter the trends and cohort patterns we have exam-
ined here.
One might also wonder whether generational decline in religious in-
volvement is largely conﬁned to particular subsets of the population, such
as white men. It is not. For example, using the full span of the GSS, 83% of
black Americans born before 1925, but only 40% of those born since 1985,
were or are strongly afﬁliated. More than three-quarters ð76%Þ of that older
black cohort said that they attend at least monthly; less than half ð48%Þ of
the younger cohort say the same. Graphs like those we have presented look
basically the same when limited to African-Americans. Women tend to be
more religious than men, but again the pattern of cohort decline is the same
for both. There are, of course, many kinds of subgroups for which one
might examine cohort patterns in religiosity, and there may well be sub-
group differences—for example, between regions, religious groups, or socio-
economic categories—to be discovered. We hope that future research will
pursue this agenda.16 For now, though, the key point is that any subgroup
15The GSS is more suitable for comparisons of the native and foreign-born than many
realize. In 2012, only 1% of the initial GSS sample was excluded because of a language
barrier, i.e., because no adult in the sampled household was able to complete the inter-
view in English or Spanish ðTom Smith, personal communicationÞ, and the foreign-born
proportion in the GSS is nearly identical to census estimates. The 2010 American Com-
munity Survey puts the foreign-born population at 13%; the GSS puts it at 13.2% in 2010,
14.7% in 2012, and 15.8% in 2014.
16King-Hele ð2010Þ and Smith et al. ð2014, chap. 2Þ examine cohort patterns within
religious subgroups.
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differences that might exist are not directly relevant to our primary claim
that, overall, cohort replacement is pushing religiosity down in the United
States. The aggregate cohort differences make clear that, whatever sub-
group differences may or may not exist, they net out to a national pattern of
substantial cohort change in religiosity.
CONCLUSION
We have established three central empirical claims. First, religiosity has
been declining in the United States for decades, albeit slowly and from high
levels. Second, religious commitment is weakening from one generation to
the next in the countries with which the United States has most in common,
and generational differences are the main driver of the aggregate decline.
Third, the same pattern of cohort replacement is behind American reli-
gious decline. This decline seems to have begun with cohorts born early in
the 20th century. At least since then, strong religious afﬁliation, church
attendance, and ﬁrm belief in God have all fallen from one birth cohort to
the next. None of these declines is happening fast, and levels of religious
involvement in the United States remain high by world standards. But the
signs of both aggregate decline and generational differences are now un-
mistakable.
Our primary contribution, however, is theoretical. Most research that
compares American religion with religion elsewhere emphasizes the high
levels of participation in the United States and treats those high levels as
strong evidence that the United States is a decisive counterexample to the
secularization thesis. We have focused on trends, and we have maintained
that both the now-clear fact of religious decline in the United States and the
cohort-driven nature of that decline show that the United States should no
longer be considered a counterexample. On the contrary, religious change in
the United States is very similar to religious change elsewhere: there is long-
term decline produced mainly by generational replacement. This process
operates slowly, and it can be counteracted in the short term by short-lived
revivals, but it is very difﬁcult to reverse. Children are raised by parents who
are less religious than their parents were, and the culture is gradually re-
shaped with the passing of each successive generation.
We offer three concluding remarks. First, an obvious agenda for future
research is to try to understand better the causal mechanisms that lie be-
hind these cohort differences. What social and cultural changes make each
generation slightly less religious than the previous one?What is the relative
importance of changes in geographical mobility, family structure, educa-
tion, technology, economic conditions, and other factors? Our aim has been
to highlight the role of generational replacement in religious decline in the
American Journal of Sociology
1548
This content downloaded from 128.041.061.070 on March 11, 2016 04:48:40 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
West. We have not tried to identify all the causal forces at work, but we
hope future research will make progress on this agenda.
Second, by emphasizing an important way in which American religion
is similar to religion elsewhere in the West, we do not mean to imply that
there are no important differences between religion in the United States
and religion elsewhere. There certainly are ways in which American reli-
gion is unique, and there remains much to explain about how it is differ-
ent from religion elsewhere in the modern world. Nor do we mean to im-
ply that there are no important differences among other Western nations
in religious trends. Every country’s experience of secularization is unique
when it comes to speciﬁcs like the onset of decline, the rate of decline, and
contingencies that may accelerate or offset cohort-driven decline in a par-
ticular time and place. Some scholars have stressed the variety of paths by
which societies have secularized or the variety of forms that secularity can
take ðMartin 2005; Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012Þ. At the same time,
however, Voas ð2009Þ showed that, although historical, political, cultural,
social, and economic differences among the dozens of European countries
produced substantial variation in the onset of secularization across the
continent, once it begins the pattern of change looks very similar in all of
them. The differences are a matter of history and culture, and explaining
them always requires a combination of the general and the particular. But
these differences should not obscure the reality that there is a general pat-
tern of religious decline that characterizes the West, including the United
States.
There are particularities to explain, but the appropriate comparative
question changes. We should ask, “Why did secularization start in the
United States when it did, and why is it proceeding at the pace that it is,
with the ﬁts and starts speciﬁc to the United States?” This is very different
from the traditional question, “Why is secularization not occurring in the
United States?” It may well be that some of the same explanatory factors
invoked in answers to the traditional question—such as church-state sepa-
ration or immigration history—help to explain why religious decline started
later and is occurring more slowly in the United States than in some other
places, even while, over the long run, religious involvement is being un-
dermined by the same forces that have operated in the rest of the industrial
and postindustrial world. The difference between these two questions is im-
portant, even if the answer to the newer question draws heavily on attempts
to answer the older one.17
17Bruce makes a similar point when he suggests that, if the religious trajectories of the
United States and Europe are not qualitatively different, then “we need only to explain
why religion in America has been slower than its European counterparts to show signs
of secularization” ð2011, p. 176Þ. We are not so sure, however, that the pace of secular-
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The larger theoretical point here is that connecting the timing and speed
of U.S secularization to features peculiar to the United States does not
make the country a counterexample to the secularization thesis any more
than explaining the timing and speed of secularization in, say, France or
Germany by reference to their unique history and culture makes those coun-
tries counterexamples to a more general pattern. Country-speciﬁc particu-
larities certainly make it more difﬁcult, perhaps impossible, to conﬁdently
forecast future levels of religiosity in theUnitedStates or elsewhere, butwe are
trying to establish a social regularity, not predict the future. Recognizing that
the United States is not a counterexample clariﬁes the nature of U.S. religious
exceptionalism and helps us to approach American-European religious dif-
ferences in more constructive ways.18
In all comparative work there is a tension between highlighting simi-
larities and differences. Each of the countries we have examined is distinc-
tive. Religious afﬁliation is somewhat lower and declining more rapidly in
Great Britain and New Zealand than in Canada and Australia. Within-
cohort change is nonexistent in Britain, modest in Canada and Australia,
and more substantial in New Zealand. The American pattern is not iden-
tical to those seen elsewhere, and the trends in other countries are not iden-
tical to one another. Our claim is simply that recognizing major points of
cross-national similarity in religious change is as important as explaining
the differences.
Our third and ﬁnal concluding remark returns to the larger debate about
secularization and the special role that the United States has played in that
debate. In recent years, accepting the United States as a decisive counter-
example to the secularization thesis has led some scholars to suggest that the
modernization-secularization connection is a peculiar historically contin-
gent fact about Europe rather than a more widely applicable sociological
process. If modernization in the United States has not led to secularization,
this argument goes, there is little reason to think that modernization will
lead to secularization elsewhere in the world, outside of Europe, Canada,
and Australia. Greeley put it this way: “Why, it is often asked, . . . is the
United States so different from Europe, where ‘secularization’ is so much
further advanced? I suggest that if Europe is indeed secularized, then a
18 It is worth noting that our position is in line with recent research on cross-national
differences in religiosity in which, by contrast with the Wald and Calhoun-Brown ð2011Þ
graph we described in the introduction, the United States is not any sort of outlier. See,
e.g., Ruiter and van Tubergen ð2009Þ and Norris ð2013Þ.
ization in the United States, at least since 1988, is slower than it is everywhere else. More-
over, comparing the rate of change across countries is complicated by Voas’s ð2009Þ ﬁnd-
ing that the pace of secularization is related to how recently it began. In any event,
systematically comparing rates of religious decline across countries is beyond the scope
of this article.
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consideration of religious practice in the rest of the world indicates that
Europe, not the United States, is unique” ð1989, p. 117Þ. For Berger et al.,
“the crucial theoretical issue . . . can be summarized as follows: is Europe
secular because it is modern, or is Europe secular because is it European?”
ð2008, p. 6Þ. And Martin made the point in a particularly expansive way:
“The much debated question as to whether Europe or North America is an
exception to the proper course of history has been transferred to the whole
world. To some degree the future of Christianity depends on the answer to
that question” ð2011, p. 66Þ.
Whether the United States is a counterexample thus opens into the larger
question whether modernity, sooner or later, will bring secularization. This
is of course a classic question in sociology. For a long time the majority of
social scientists answered afﬁrmatively, but the critics of secularization
turned the tide so effectively that today the weight of scholarly opinion is
on the other side. America’s accepted status as a counterexample did much
to shift opinion in that direction. We are not prepared to say that removing
that status should by itself reinstate the old idea that modernity every-
where will bring secularization eventually. We are prepared to say, how-
ever, that since it is no longer clear that the United States is on a qualita-
tively different religious trajectory than Europe, it is too soon to assert that
the secularization thesis does not apply outside of Europe, Canada, and
Australia. It now seems that the classic question—does modernization un-
dermine religion?—has been prematurely answered, “not in general.” That
answer should be reconsidered in light of the evidence we have presented
here.
Our goal has been to establish that the United States should no longer be
considered a counterexample to the secularization thesis. We do not claim
that altering the theoretical status of American religion in this way proves
that the secularization thesis is correct. It may be that the full range of
relevant evidence justiﬁes rejecting the thesis, regardless of our ﬁndings.
Although we do not think that is the case, our goal has not been to defend
the secularization thesis in its entirety but to challenge the essentially un-
questioned status of the United States as decisive evidence against it. Un-
dermining the America-as-counterexample claim will not settle the secu-
larization debate, but it should alter the ground on which it is conducted.
APPENDIX
Linear Decomposition
The numbers in table 1 are based on Firebaugh’s technique for decomposing
aggregate change into within- and between-cohort components ðFirebaugh
and Davis 1988; Firebaugh 1989, 1997Þ. The starting point is a straightfor-
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ward linear regression of some measure of religious participation ðyÞ on sur-
vey year and birth year:
yij 5 a1 b1survey yeari 1 b2birth yearj 1 εij:
Although the method was devised for individual-level data, it also is suit-
able for aggregate data, where the yij are mean values for the survey year/
birth year combination. We simply weight the data according to the percent-
age of respondents within a given survey year who were born in each year.
This strategy has the advantage that we can allow for changes in the sample
size over time; in aggregate, each calendar year receives equal weight. By
halving the weights for GSS years up to 1991, we also easily adjust for the
overrepresentation of years during the period when the GSS was conducted
every year instead of every other year. In doing so we follow the recom-
mendation of Firebaugh and Davis ð1988, p. 258Þ.
Having performed this weighted least squares regression, we then mul-
tiply the survey year coefﬁcient by the length of the time span between the
ﬁrst and last survey to estimate the impact of intracohort change over the
period of observation. Similarly, we multiply the birth year coefﬁcient by
the difference between the mean birth years at the beginning and end of the
period to estimate the effect of cohort replacement. The sum of these two
estimates should be close to the actual change over the period if there are
not large nonlinearities or interactions in the data.
For Australia and New Zealand, the actual values come from censuses,
and so no smoothing is necessary. For Great Britain, Canada, and the United
States, the religious indicators come from surveys and are subject to sam-
pling error. We average the indicator values for the ﬁrst and last two years
in each series to obtain more reliable measures of change over the full pe-
riod. These measures are then adjusted to apply to the full period, rather
than to the slightly shorter span between the averaged years ðand hence the
ﬁgure in table 1 col. 5 is not simply the difference between those in cols. 3
and 4Þ. For example, if the series covers 1980, 1982, . . . 2010, 2012, the dif-
ference between the averaged ﬁrst and last two values will reﬂect change
over the 30-year period between 1981 and 2011; multiplying that difference
by 32/30 gives us a smoothed estimate of change over the full period from
1980 to 2012.
As can be seen in table 1, our models all ﬁt the data well; they produce
aggregate change estimates that are close to the observed change. The dis-
crepancy is typically no more than a percentage point.
If cohort replacement and intracohort change push in the same direc-
tion, then the cohort replacement effect can be divided by the sum of the
inter- and intracohort effects to yield an estimate of the proportion of total
aggregate change attributable to cohort replacement. But this calculation
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is not sensible when, as in some of our data, cohort replacement and in-
tracohort change work in opposite directions. In our data, cohort replace-
ment always pushes aggregate religiosity down, but in some cases intra-
cohort change pushes it up, although never by enough to offset the force of
cohort replacement. In these instances, the cohort replacement component
can be interpreted as an estimate of how much aggregate religiosity would
have declined because of cohort replacement were it not for intracohort
change in the other direction.
The graphical and linear decomposition methods provide distinct and
complementary descriptions. In the graphical approach, multiple birth
years ðusually 10Þ are collapsed into a single cohort, and the three-survey
moving averages provide a degree of smoothing within each cohort, but
otherwise the points plotted show the full complexity of change between
and within cohorts. By contrast, the statistical decomposition is based on
raw values for each individual year of birth and survey year, from which
the regression produces smooth trends.
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